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Abstract
Background: Travel is a potent force in the emergence of disease. We
discussed how the traveler case reports could aid in a timely detection of a
disease outbreak.
Methods: Using the traveler data, we estimated a few indicators of the
epidemic that affected decision making and policy, including the exponential
growth rate, the doubling time, and the probability of severe cases exceed-
ing the hospital capacity, in the initial phase of the COVID-19 epidemic in
multiple countries. We imputed the arrival dates when they were missing.
We compared the estimates from the traveler data to the ones from domes-
tic data. We quantitatively evaluated the influence of each case report and
knowing the arrival date on the estimation. We developed a simple disease
detection criterion that could help make future decisions.
Findings: Using only the travel report data, we estimated the travel origin’s
daily exponential growth rate in a moving window fashion that mimic the
reality, and examined the date from which the growth rate was consistently
above 0.1 (equivalent to doubling time < 7 days). We found those dates were
very close to the dates that critical decisions were made such as city lock-
downs and national emergency announcement. In addition, our estimated
probability of severe cases exceeding the hospital capacity hit above 0.9 on
the day Wuhan announced lock-down. Using only the traveler data, if the
assumed epidemic start date was relatively accurate and the traveler sample
was representative of the general population, the growth rate estimated from
the traveler data was consistent with the domestic data. We also discussed
situations that the traveler data could lead to biased estimates. From the
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data influence study, we found more recent travel cases had a larger influence
on each day’s estimate, and the influence of each case report got smaller as
more cases became available. We provided the minimum number of exported
cases needed to determine whether the local epidemic growth rate was above
a certain level, and developed a user-friendly Shiny App to accommodate
various scenarios.
Interpretation: The traveler data are useful information that help the early
detection of a disease outbreak in the travel origin. The traveler data also
have limitations that would need further information to refine. We advo-
cate that countries should work in a collaborative way to share the traveler
information about the travel dates and more detailed travel history at sub-
national level, in a timely manner.
Funding: NIH/NIAID 5R01AI136664
Keywords: Disease Outbreaks, Traveler Case Report, Value of Information
1. Introduction
Since 2014, there have been five “public health emergency of interna-
tional concern” (PHEIC) declarations including the most recent outbreak of
COVID-19 [1]. Major challenges in early warning and rapid response to an
emerging disease outbreak include the lack of epidemiological and laboratory
techniques where disease started, and the fear of the negative impact that
reporting the outbreak would have on trade and tourism [2, 3]. At the same
time, travel is a potent force in the emergence of disease [4]. Travelers play
a key role in a disease spreading out from local to global.
We believe that the case reports among travelers are informative data
source for detecting the disease outbreaks. The WHO International Health
Regulations (IHR) provided the instructions for nations to report diseases
found in incoming travelers, and the regulations were revised to accommo-
date warnings of unknown infectious diseases [3]. [5] estimated the outbreak
size of 2019-nCoV in Wuhan from the number of confirmed cases that have
been exported to cities outside mainland China shortly after the lockdown
in Wuhan. Other early studies that estimated the outbreak size in Wuhan
using the cases exported include [6, 7].
In this article, we used the travelers data to estimate two important quan-
titative measures, the exponential growth rate (equivalent to doubling time)
and the probability of severe cases exceeding hospital capacity, to detect the
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disease outbreak in five travel origins (origins), Wuhan (China), Egypt, Iran,
Italy, and United States. We investigated the contributions and limitations
of traveler data on understanding the COVID-19 epidemic at its beginning
stage. Our main contributions to the literature include: 1. Instead of using
accumulated traveler cases up to a certain time point to get one estimate,
we provided daily estimates so that we could see how the estimates of the
key measures were evolving in the early stage. 2. A lot of the traveler case
reports only provided the dates when travelers tested positive, without their
actual arrival dates. We demonstrated that the arrival date was important
in estimating those key measures and provided a probability model to im-
pute the arrival date. 3. We used a statistically rigorous way to evaluate
the influence of each case report and knowing the arrival dates on estimat-
ing the exponential growth rate. 4. We used the travel origin’s domestic
data to benchmark the estimates from the travel case report and pointed out
that there was a potential sampling bias in the travelers population so that
the prevalence estimated from the traveler data might be different from the
domestic estimate. We made the first attempt to adjust the bias but also
acknowledge that we would need further information about the difference
between travelers and the general population to fully address this issue. 5.
We provided a simple criterion to determine the severity of the local epi-
demic based on the cumulative number of exported cases, and developed an
easy-to-use app for practical usage. Finally, we discussed how to enhance
global infectious disease surveillance by utilizing traveler case reports in a
collaborative way.
2. Methods
2.1. Data Sources
We chose five places (four countries and one city) whose COVID-19 out-
breaks were detected relatively early in their region as illustrative examples
of travel origins. They were Wuhan (China), Italy, Iran, Egypt and United
States. For each origin, we investigated the exported cases in the early stage
of the country’s epidemic. We picked the start date as the date when the
country announced its first confirmed case. We picked the end date as the
date the country announced national emergency or implemented lock-down
order. Table 1 summarizes the start date, the end date, the total number of
exported traveler case reports and the total number of exported destinations
within the study period. Without the daily travel volume, we assumed that
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the travel volume to each destination was constant over this short period of
time. The reasons for using those dates and the associated travel volume
data are provided in Appendix A.1.
Table 1: The start date of the local epidemic, the end date of study period, the total
number of exported traveler case reports within the study period, and the total number
of exported destinations within the study period.
start date of the
local epidemic
end date of the
study period
number of
exported cases
number of
destinations
Wuhan Dec 1, 2019 Jan 23, 2020 11 cases 7 destinations
U.S. Jan 20, 2020 Mar 13, 2020 25 cases 5 destinations
Italy Jan 31, 2020 Feb 28, 2020 57 cases 19 destinations
Iran Feb 19, 2020 Feb 27, 2020 90 cases 12 destinations
Egypt Feb 14, 2020 Mar 6, 2020 9 cases 4 destinations
We obtained the traveler case reports within the period specified above
from [8] with re-verification of their travel histories using government and
media reports. Our analysis focused on the infections that likely occurred
in the origin rather than transmitted during the trip. Therefore, we counted
multiple confirmed cases from the same tour group or the same family as one,
and excluded the cases that were related to the cruise ships because a large
number of travelers being infected upon arrival made it difficult to trace the
travel history of the first infected case. The travel case report data used in
our analysis is provided in Appendix B.
For each travel origin, we also obtained the domestic case reports to
model its growth curve as a comparison with the one estimated from the
travel report. The city level data for Wuhan were obtained from [9]; and the
country level data for United States, Italy, Iran and Egypt were obtained
from COVID-19 Data Repository by the Center for Systems Science and
Engineering (CSSE) at Johns Hopkins University [10].
2.2. Assumptions and key indicators of interest
In the initial phase of an emerging infectious disease outbreak, the infected
cases and the recovered cases are both rare. So, the size of the susceptible
population approximately equals to the whole population size, N . Let ρt
be the prevalence rate (number of infected over total population size) t days
after the epidemic first started. We assume that the prevalence rate increases
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exponentially in this period,
ρt = exp (β0 + β1t), (1)
where β1 is the exponential growth rate. N ·exp (β0) is the number of infected
people when the epidemic first started. It came from each country’s official
announcement of their first confirmed case(s). In our study, this number is
either 1 or 2. Note that the exact date of the first infection was hard to know,
especially in the beginning of the outbreak, but some preliminary evidence
might offer possible dates. We explored different possible start dates in the
sensitivity analysis.
Another commonly used indicator, the doubling time, Td, is given by
Td = log 2/β1. The doubling time is the period that takes the number of
infected individuals to double. Both the exponential growth rate (β1) and the
doubling time (Td) measure the speed of the transmission which determines
the scale of the epidemic.
Infection among medical professionals and death rate increase signifi-
cantly when the health care system is overwhelmed. So, another important
indicator we care about is the probability of the number of severe case pa-
tients exceeding the hospital capacity. Both the severe case patients and the
hospital capacity are not evenly distributed within a country. Therefore, it
would not make sense to compare the total number of severe case patients in
a country to the national hospital capacity. Instead, we focused on one city
level analysis (Wuhan) as an example.
2.3. Statistical modeling of the prevalence in the origin country
Our goal was to use the traveler case reports to infer the prevalence rate,
or the exponential growth rate, in the origin country. For each origin, let
nit be the number of infected travelers who arrived at destination i at time
t, and Ni be the size of average daily travelers of destination i in the study
period. We assumed that the number of infected travelers followed a binomial
distribution as below:
nit|Ni, ρt, α ∼ Binomial(Ni, ρt · exp (α)), (2)
where ρt was the prevalence rate in the general population, and α captured
the potential sampling bias in the travelers. If the group of travelers was
a representative sample of the general population, the travelers would have
the same rate of infection as the general population, so α = 0. If for some
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reason we believed that the travelers were more or less likely to get infected,
we would expect a non-zero α.
Instead of using all of the reports up to the end date and providing one
estimate of β1 for each origin country, we provided daily update of β1 to mimic
the real-world decision making process. Specifically, for each origin, starting
from the date with the first exported case report, t1, for all t > t1, we ran
the above model with all the data up to day t and provide a β1 estimate. By
doing so, we were able to see how the origin country’s β1 estimate changed
as the exported case reports accumulated, and when we could detect the
outbreak with some consistency.
The destination countries with advanced public health infrastructures
were more likely to detect the imported cases, and citizens from those coun-
tries might prefer returning to their countries for treatment when feeling sick.
Therefore, it was possible that the groups of people who chose to travel to
different destinations had different infection rates. We could address this
heterogeneity by adding a destination specific random effect parameter bi:
nit|Ni, ρt, α, bi ∼ Binomial(Ni, ρt · exp (α + bi)). (3)
When fitting the real data, we tested the significance of this heterogeneity
parameter bi and found it not significant because of small sample sizes at the
destination level. Therefore, we only reported results from the basic model
as in (2).
We used Bayesian inference to estimate the parameters. Details about
the choice of priors and hyper parameters are provided in Appendix A.2.
2.4. Imputing the missing arrival dates
In the initial period of the epidemic, there was not an airport-based trav-
eler screening system. Therefore, a non-negligible proportion of arrival dates
of the confirmed cases were missing in the early government and media re-
ports. The accumulated missing proportions were 9.1% for Wuhan (China),
60.0% for United States, 89.5% for Italy, 88.9% for Iran and 66.7% for Egypt.
To accurately estimate β1, it was necessary to impute those missing arrival
dates by estimating the time interval between the arrival date and case confir-
mation date for each case. We modeled this time interval Tij for destination
i and case j by using a negative binomial distribution with a destination-
specific mean µi and a dispersion parameter φ. In addition, some destination
countries did not report any arrival dates of infected travelers. To estimate
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the time intervals for those countries, we pooled µi towards a common mean.
Specifically, the model was as follows:
Tij|µi, φ ∼ NegBinomial(µi, φ)
µi ∼ Gamma(λ, 1)
Bayesian estimation was implemented and the choice of priors is provided in
Appendix A.2. We used the observed pairs of arrival dates and confirmation
dates to estimate the negative binomial parameters and generated posterior
predictive distribution of the missing Tij.
Finally, due to the delay of the diagnostic confirmation, we expected a
proportion of travelers would not have been tested by the end of the study,
and the undiagnostic rate would be higher in the later dates. For travelers
arriving at destination i on day t, we down-scaled the average daily traveler
size Ni by a factor of qit = P (Tij ≤ tend − t), where tend is the study end
date and Tij follows the negative binomial distribution. The final model we
fitted was the following:
nit|Ni, ρt, α ∼ Binomial(Ni · qit, ρt · exp (α)), (4)
Rather than imputing the missing arrival date with the posterior mean or
median of Tij, we fitted model (4) with each posterior sample of Tij and the
corresponding qit. Therefore, the final uncertainty estimate of β1 included
the uncertainty of the missing arrival dates.
2.5. Comparison with the domestic data estimation
Our goal was to estimate the epidemic in the general population of those
five origins by using their travelers data. As pointed out before, using only
the travelers data might generate potential biases. We formally investigated
the biases by comparing the estimates from the travelers data with the ones
from the domestic case reports.
[11] carefully studied and reconstructed the full transmission dynamics
in the early period of the COVID-19 epidemic in Wuhan by fitting a 7-
compartment model. From their model output, we could derive the expo-
nential growth rate before Jan 23, 2020 (assumed to be a constant) being
0.187 with 95% credible interval (0.178, 0.196). Unfortunately, similar results
were not readily available for the other four travel origins due to limitations
of the data and knowledge about their early stages. Instead, using the same
data as in [9], we fitted an exponential growth model to the domestic daily
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records of new infections. We found that for Wuhan (China), the directly
fitted exponential growth rate was 0.175 with 95% confidence interval (0.160,
0.190). The large overlap between the two confidence intervals suggested that
the exponential growth curve was a good approximation to transmission dy-
namic in the beginning of the disease outbreak. Therefore, for the other
origins, we used the exponential growth rate fitted by this simple model us-
ing domestic records in [10] to serve as a comparison with the one estimated
from the travelers data.
2.6. Estimating the probability of severe case exceeding hospital capacity
[12] estimated that 19.2% of infected individuals needed to be hospital-
ized. The number of hospital beds available to accept severe COVID-19
patients in Wuhan on January 21 was 800, according to [13]. We denote
the number of severe case patients on day t by St, and St = 0.192 · N · ρt.
For Wuhan, the probability that the number of severe cases exceed hospital
capacity is then defined as
pt = P (St > 800)
Using data up to day t, the posterior distribution of β1 estimated from model
(4) gave us the posterior distribution of St. From there, we updated pt, the
daily probability of hospital being overwhelmed.
2.7. Evaluating the traveler data impacts
In decision theory, we can evaluate the impact of a piece of information
by comparing the risks with and without that information. The reduction
in the risk is referred to as the value of information (VOI). In this study, we
evaluated two types of impacts on estimating the exponential growth rate
β1. They were 1. the traveler cases confirmed on day t, from the first date a
travel case was confirmed to the end date of the study; and 2. knowing the
actual arrival date of each case.
In Bayesian inference, when the goal is to provide a probabilistic estimate
of a certain indicator, one proper risk is the integrated quadratic distance
(IQD) [14], which measures the difference between two distributions. The
IQD can be calculated as follows:
r(F,G) = EF,G|θF − θG| − 1
2
[
EF |θF − θ′F |+ EG|θG − θ′G|
]
, (5)
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where, in Bayesian decision theory, G is the estimated distribution and F is
the true distribution of θ, θF is a random variable following the distribution
F , θG is a random variable following the distribution G, and θF and θ
′
F are
two independent random variables following the distribution F . The true
distribution is often unknown and thus replaced by the posterior distribution
of θ given the full data. In that case, the VOI of any piece of information
reduces to r(F,G), where F is θ’s posterior distribution given the full data,
and G is θ’s posterior distribution given the partial data by removing the
piece of information we are interested in evaluating, such as missing arrival
dates or one day’s report [15].
For each day after the first case report, we would like to evaluate the
influence of all available information on making the current day’s decision.
Specifically, to evaluate the impact of daily travel case reports on day t, we
performed the following analysis.
1. Estimated the posterior distribution of β1 given all the data up to day
t, denoted as Ft.
2. For i ≤ t, removed day i’s case report from the data, and estimated
the posterior distribution of β1 given the partial data, denoted by G
c
t(i),
where c stands for case reports. Calculated rct(i) using Equation (5), by
setting F = Ft, and G = G
c
t(i).
To evaluate the impact of knowing the arrival date, we performed the
similar analysis. The only difference was setting G = Gat(i) the posterior
distribution of β1 given the partial data that removed the arrival date of
day i’s report, and imputed the missing arrival date following the procedure
described in Section 2.4. The superscript a stands for arrival dates.
The procedure above allowed us to evaluate the information in three
different aspects: 1. For each day’s decision, rank the influence of all the
previous days’ case reports and the arrival dates; 2. For each day’s decision,
compare the influence of the number of cases v.s. knowing the arrival date for
the same time point (rct(i) v.s. r
a
t(i)); and 3. As time moves forward, compare
the influence of the same day’s report (rct(i) v.s. r
c
t′(i)) and arrival date (r
a
t(i)
v.s. rat′(i)).
Finally, when we remove a day’s case report, we would like the effects
to be purely due to the number of cases not observed, rather than a mix
of not knowing the arrival date and not observing the cases. Therefore, we
only performed this analysis on the Wuhan data since Wuhan only had one
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missing arrival date in our study period while the rest of the origins all had
over 50% of missing arrival dates.
2.8. Detecting future disease outbreaks
Finally, we would like to develop a useful tool for policy makers to deter-
mine the severity of a country’s epidemic based on the number of exported
cases. Statistically, we could form the question as a hypothesis testing prob-
lem. On each day, based on the cumulative number of exported cases up to
that day, we could test whether the exponential growth rate is significantly
above a certain threshold, for example 0.1.
H0 : β1 = 0.1 v.s. H1 : β1 > 0.1
We used a simulation based hypothesis testing procedure as follows:
1. Define the initial prevalence at a very low level such as one over the
population size of the travel origin.
2. Calculate the time series of true prevalence rates following Equation
(1) given the exponential growth rate at the null (H0) value.
3. Let N be the daily average of outbound traveler sizes.
4. Generate a time series of daily number of infected travelers from the
binomial distributions provided in Equation (2). Record the cumulative
number of traveler cases up to each day since the first exported case.
5. Repeat Step 4 100,000 times. Summarize the empirical distributions
of the cumulative number of traveler cases over the repetitions in two
ways depending on whether the initial date of the local infection is
known:
(a) If the initial date is known, we summarize the empirical distribu-
tions of the cumulative number of traveler cases stratified by the
number of days since the initial local infection.
(b) If the initial date is unknown, we summarize the empirical distri-
butions of the cumulative number of traveler cases stratified by
the number of days since the first exported case. In this case, day
1 represents the date when the first exported case happens.
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An extremely large number of traveler cases indicates a higher than
expected growth rate.
6. Define a significance level and visualize the cumulative number of trav-
eler cases that would be needed to reject H0 for each day since the first
exported case.
3. Results
The results section is organized in the following way. In Section 3.1 we
present the results for the estimated time intervals between arrival date and
case confirmation date by origin and destination. In Section 3.2, we illustrate
how the estimated origin exponential growth rate and the doubling time
changed as more case reports became available over time, and investigate
the probability of severe COVID-19 cases exceeding the number of available
beds in Wuhan, China. In Section 3.3, we conduct the sensitivity analysis to
the initial number of cases. In Section 3.4, we discuss the impact of knowing
the traveler cases and the travel dates on shaping the epidemic trend.
3.1. Time intervals between arrival and case confirmation
Figure 1 presents the distribution of time interval from arrival to diagnosis
by origin: (a) Wuhan, China, (b) United States, (c) Egypt, (d) Iran and (e)
Italy. Iran travelers had the shortest time interval with a median of 2.64
days shown by the pink dashed line and a 95% credible interval of (1.51,
4.20) days. The first exported case from Iran was confirmed on Feb 20,
2020. Iran announced the first two COVID-19 infection related deaths on
Feb 19 [16], and reported 29 new cases by Feb 22. This might imply that
other countries had set a higher detection priority to people traveling from
Iran since Feb 19. For travelers from other places, the time intervals are
summarized as follows. Wuhan, China has a median of 4.10 days and a 95%
credible interval of (1.01,10.10) days; United States has a median of 6.01 days
and a 95% credible interval of (1.69,13.90) days; Egypt has a median of 9.28
days and a 95% credible interval of (2.44, 21.10) days; Italy has a median of
9.64 days and a 95% credible interval of (3.86,18.79) days.
The time to diagnosis was further stratified by destinations using box
plots in each sub-figure, and the destinations were arranged in an increasing
order of the median time interval from top to bottom. We only presented
results for destinations that had reported the arrival dates within the study
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(a) Departure from Wuhan, China
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South Korea
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(d) Departure from Iran
Canada
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Canada
7.5 10.0 12.5 15.0
(e) Departure from Italy
Romania
Denmark
Algeria
Switzerland
Brazil
5 10 15 20
Figure 1: Posterior median, interquartile, and 95% credible interval of time to diagnosis
by departure city/country and destinations. Each box represents the interquartile of the
posterior of time to diagnosis by departure city/country, with the middle bar indicating
the posterior median and the whisker showing the 95% credible interval. The red dots are
observed time to diagnosis for the pairs of arrival dates and confirmed dates. The pink
dashed line represents the overall median time to diagnosis across all destinations.
period. If a country had imported cases within the study period but did not
release the arrival date of any case, then its median time interval would be
the overall median across other destinations that had reported the arrival
dates indicated by the pink dashed line. For China, Iran and Italy, most of
the destinations are their neighboring countries. Before Jan 23, 2020, seven
destinations detected COVID-19 cases among travelers from Wuhan. They
were South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Thailand, United States, Japan, and
Vietnam. By Aug 14, 2020, the numbers of reported COVID-19 related
deaths were 7 in Taiwan, 21 in Vietnam, 27 in Singapore, 58 in Thailand,
305 in South Korea and 1,073 in Japan [10]. Those six places are among the
strongest performers in the COVID-19 pandemic so far. The early detection
of emerging infectious diseases among travelers did not only ring the alarm
for the travel origin, but also allowed the destinations better prepare for the
potential pandemic.
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(a) βˆ1 (left) and Tˆd (right) in Wuhan, China between Jan 13 and Jan 23
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(b) βˆ1 (left) and Tˆd (right) in United States between Mar 6 and Mar 13
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(c) βˆ1 (left) and Tˆd (right) in Italy between Feb 25 and Feb 28
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(d) βˆ1 (left) and Tˆd (right) in Iran between Feb 20 and Feb 27
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(e) βˆ1 (left) and Tˆd (right) in Egypt between Feb 28 and Mar 6
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Figure 2: Posterior mean and 95% credible interval of exponential growth rate β1 at early
COVID-19 outbreak stage in (a) Wuhan, China, (b) United States, (c) Italy, (d) Iran, (e)
Egypt. The black dots are the posterior mean and the grey bands are the 95% confidence
credible intervals estimated from traveler data. The red horizontal lines indicate the mean
(solid) and 95% confidence interval (dashed) estimated from domestic data.
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3.2. Exponential growth rate, doubling time, and the probability of severe
COVID-19 cases exceeding the hospital capacity
For each origin, we obtained estimates of the exponential growth rate, β1,
and the doubling time, Td, by fitting the model described in Section 2.3 to
the traveler case reports up to different dates. Figure 2 visualizes how the
mean estimates and 95% uncertainty bounds of β1 and Td changed as more
confirmed cases became available over time.
The sequential updates of βˆ1 and Tˆd became more stable over time. For
all travel origins, within three days after the initial exported case report, the
estimated lower bound of the exponential growth rate was above 0.1, which
corresponded to the doubling time being significantly less than one week.
Table 2 summarizes the dates on which the estimated exponential growth
rate, β1, was significantly greater than 0.1. We found less than ten exported
case reports would be needed and the detection dates were within three days
after the first exported case report for all countries.
Table 2: The dates on which the estimated exponential growth rate, β1, was significantly
greater than 0.1. For each date, we also provide the number of days after the first exported
case confirmation and the cumulative number of exported case reports.
detection date number of days number of cases
Wuhan Jan 15 2 days 2 cases
U.S. Mar 9 3 days 3 cases
Italy Feb 25 1 day 9 cases
Iran Feb 21 1 day 2 cases
Egypt Feb 28 0 day 1 case
The estimated exponential growth rate in Wuhan, Iran, Italy and United
States showed an overall increasing trend at the beginning of the outbreak
after the confirmation of the first exported case. The decreasing trend of
βˆ1 in Egypt was because we assumed the epidemic in Egypt started on Feb
14, 2020 with only one infected individual on that date. A high level of
growth rate would be needed to observe many traveler cases between March
1, 2020 and March 6, 2020. Since the travel date of the first exported case
from Italy (confirmed on Feb 24, 2020) was unknown, βˆ1 and dˆT had a larger
uncertainty when only observing the first exported case.
To compare the estimates from travelers data with the ones from domestic
data, we fitted exponential growth curves to the domestic daily records using
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[9] for Wuhan (China) and the COVID-19 Data Repository [10] for United
States, Italy, Iran and Egypt. To maximize the sample size, we chose the end
date of the domestic data to be 5 days (the mean incubation period) after
the country announced national emergency or implemented lock-down order.
The mean estimates and confidence intervals of the growth rates were 0.175
(0.160, 0.190) for Wuhan (China), 0.124 (0.108, 0.140) for United States,
0.171 (0.116, 0.226) for Italy, 0.488 (0.449, 0.527) for Iran, 0.153 (0.110, 0.196)
for Egypt. We indicated these estimates and intervals with horizontal red
lines in Figure 2. The domestic data mean estimates for United States, Italy
and Egypt were significantly lower than the traveler data based estimates.
Some possible reasons for the discrepancy include: (a) their initial numbers
of cases were larger (see sensitivity analysis in Section 3.3); (b) the number
of infected increased faster than the testing capacity in the early period; (c)
the number of travelers had declined within the study period; and (d) the
travelers did not represent the general population thus could bear a higher
or lower infection rate. (a) and (b) could lead to underestimated growth
rate using domestic data. (c) could lead to overestimated growth rate using
traveler data. (d) could lead to either direction of biases.
In Figure 3, we plotted the probability of severe COVID-19 cases exceed-
ing the number of available beds in Wuhan. With the first exported case
confirmation on Jan 13, the probability was at a relatively low level around
26%. It jumped to 54% when the third exported case was confirmed on Jan
17, and kept increasing as new case reports became available over time. The
probability exceeded 90% on Jan 23, indicating that hospitals would soon be
overwhelmed with COVID-19 patients.
3.3. Sensitivity analysis to the initial number of cases
In the previous analysis, we assumed the epidemic start date for each
origin as the date when they announced their first case(s), denoted as t0.
In this section, we investigated how the estimate of the exponential growth
rate, βˆ1, would have changed if the epidemic had started earlier. An earlier
starting date is equivalent to there were more cases at t0 than 1 or 2. We
reran the analysis with the number of cases at t0 being 10, 100, and 1000
respectively.
Figure 4 presents the estimated exponential growth rates using traveler
data and different initial number of cases, as well as the exponential growth
rates estimated from domestic data (red horizontal lines). The black lines
indicated the original model fits assuming that the number of initial cases was
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Figure 3: Posterior probability of the number of severe cases exceeds the number of avail-
able hospital beds in Wuhan China during Jan 13, 2020 - Jan 23, 2020.
either 1 or 2 at t0. A larger number of initial cases corresponded to a lower
estimate of the exponential growth rate. For Wuhan and Italy (panels (a)
and (c) in Figure 4), the current assumed initial case number (epidemic start
date) seemed to be reasonable. For Iran (panel (d)), the first government
announcement in Iran regarding to COVID-19 was two deaths on Feb 19,
2020 [16]. We assumed that the start date was 20 days before, based on that
the first COVID-19 related death in Wuhan was on Jan 9, 2020 with symptom
onset on Dec 20, 2019. This appeared to be a reasonable assumption given the
traveler data estimates (black) crossing the domestic data estimated interval
(red) in the end. For United States, Italy and Egypt (panels (b), (c) and
(e))), their 95% credible intervals at the end date of study period were above
the domestic data estimates which better matched with “100 cases” scenario
or “1000 cases” scenario.
There were two reasons that we might set the initial number of cases at a
higher level: one was the under-reporting of initial cases; and the other was
the epidemic being limited to a sub-national area where the ratio between
the traveler size and the local population size was much higher than the
national average. Note that we had used the national population as the
reference to calculate the initial COVID-19 prevalence rates in United States,
Italy, Iran and Egypt. If the outbreak was limited within a sub-national
area, one should adjust both the reference population size and the traveler
size from the national level to the sub-national level. This would not affect
the estimate of the growth rate if the ratio between the traveler size and
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reference population size at the sub-national level is equal to that ratio at
the national level. However, for areas such as tourism sites, the ratio between
traveler size and the reference population size could be much higher than the
national average. For instance, [17] commented that “Egypt is an agricultural
country. Most tourism destinations are in special locations far away from
residential places and have low population densities.” If the Egypt outbreak
was indeed only at the tourism destinations where the reference population
size was small but the international traveler volume was large, then βˆ1 for
the tourism destinations in Egypt should be similar to “100 cases” or “1000
cases” scenario in Figure 4 (e), which did not have the surprisingly high
estimates in the first couple of days, and better matched with the estimates
from the domestic daily records. Unfortunately, most traveler case reports
only provided the countries being visited but not the sub-national areas.
We also noticed that the prevalence ρt in the origin was less sensitive to
the assumption of the start date. Therefore, the total number of cases and
severe cases were similar in different scenarios. As seen in Figure 4 (f), the
probabilities of the number of severe cases exceeding the number of available
hospital beds in Wuhan China were similar.
Finally, we found that the differences of βˆ1s among different scenarios of
initial cases became smaller as more traveller case reports became available
over time. The effect of initial number of cases will be addressed quantita-
tively in Section 3.4.
3.4. Impact of daily traveler case reports and travel dates
As described in the Methods section, we conducted a series of analysis on
the Wuhan outbound traveler case report data to evaluate the influence of
different information on each day’s estimate. Every time a new case report
was observed, we computed the value of information of all of the previous case
reports on making the current day’s decision (estimation). The case reports
among Wuhan travelers were available on Jan 13 (one case), Jan 15 (one
case), Jan 17 (one case), Jan 20 (one case), Jan 21 (two cases), Jan 22 (two
cases), and Jan 23 (three cases). Figure 5 presents the value of information
(VOI) analysis results. Figure 5 was organized by decision (estimation) date.
In each sub-figure, we calculated the VOI of all of the case reports up to this
date on estimating the current β1, and displayed them using the blue line.
We also calculated the VOI of knowing each arrival date on estimating the
current β1, and displayed them using the red line. We had the following
findings:
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1. For the days with the same number of cases, we observed that the more
recently confirmed cases had higher VOI than the earlier cases, except that
the case on 01-13 had a higher VOI than the case on 01-15. This was because
for all the other cases, the earlier the arrival dates, the earlier the confirmed
date (for the date with multiple confirmations we looked at the average arrival
date). However, the arrival date of the 01-15 case was earlier than the 01-13
case. Therefore we concluded that the more recent arrival cases had higher
VOIs.
2. From sub-figures (d), (e) and (f), we observed that the days with a larger
number of case confirmations had a larger VOI.
3. Each case report’s VOI decreased over time. This was because first each
case became less recent as we moved along the decision date, and second as
more case reports became available, the expected loss of removing one case
report got smaller.
4. In terms of knowing the arrival dates, in general, it was also true that the
more recent arrival dates had higher VOIs. In addition, the more cases in
each report, the larger its VOI was. Note that one of the two cases on 01-22
had missing arrival date, and thus the VOI of 01-22 arrival dates measured
the effect of removing one arrival date.
5. Comparing the VOI of the case reports and the VOI of the arrival dates,
we found that in general the case reports had higher VOIs than the arrival
dates and the gap was larger for more recent dates. Note that the arrival date
of the 01-15 case was 01-06 (the slowest time to diagnosis) and the arrival
date of the 01-20 case report was 01-19 (the fastest time to diagnosis). Their
arrival date VOIs were very close to (and sometimes exceeded) the case report
VOIs. It suggested the case reports would be less useful without arrival dates,
especially when the time to diagnosis was much longer or shorter than the
average, which made the imputation inaccurate.
3.5. Number of cases needed to detect the disease outbreak
To demonstrate how many exported cases needed to detect a disease
outbreak with certain statistical significance, we conducted the hypothesis
test of whether the exponential growth rate exceeded 0.1. We used the initial
prevalence, 0.01%, corresponding to one initial infection in a place with one
million people, and set daily average of outbound traveler size at N = 1, 000.
18
Figure 6 illustrates the minimum required cumulative number of traveler
cases for each day to detect β1 > 0.1, in the case of known (top) and unknown
(bottom) initial local infection date. The significance levels were set to be
0.05, 0.01 and 0.001. First of all, more traveler cases were needed to draw
the conclusion at a higher significance level. The number of cases needed
increased as the epidemic went into a later period. In an extreme case, if on
the first day of the epidemic there was already an exported case, we would be
highly confident that the local infection rate was very high. When making
decisions to detect a future disease outbreak on a certain day, if we have
relatively accurate information about how long it has been since the first
local infection, we can use the top figure to compare the total number of
exported cases up to this day. At a pre-specified significance level, say 5%, if
the total number has exceeded the number of the corresponding date in the
figure, we would be able to tell that with 95% confidence the local epidemic
has an exponential growth rate bigger than 0.1. If we do not know the initial
infection date, we would count how many days it has been since the first
exported case, and compare with the bottom figure.
A Shinny App for implementing the above hypothesis testing was pro-
vided in Appendix C, where users could specify the initial prevalence, the
null hypothesis, the daily average of outbound traveler sizes, the number of
simulations, and the significance level. With this tool, policy makers could
adjust the parameters to fit their own country’s situation, and quickly deter-
mine how severe their country’s epidemic is based on the exported cases.
4. Discussion
We used the COVID-19 epidemic as an example to illustrate how the
traveler case reports could be used to detect a disease outbreak at early
stage. We found that the dates that our estimated indicators exceeded certain
threshold (exponential growth rate were significantly above 0.1 (doubling
time < 7 days), and probability of COVID-19 patients exceeding hospital
capacity > 90%) were all within the period that critical policies (city lock-
downs and announcing national emergencies) were made based on domestic
data. In general, using the traveler data was effective in detecting a disease
outbreak in the travel origin.
From the data impact study, we found that knowing the actual arrival
dates improved the estimates. In addition, more detailed travel history at
sub-national level helped countries identify whether the outbreak was within
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a region or at the national level. For instance, without such information
for patients with travel history to Egypt, we could not tell whether the ini-
tial epidemic was limited to tourism sites. Given the spreading speed of
an emerging infection, it would be desirable to have early warning at sub-
national levels. The proposed method can also detect the emerging disease
outbreak at sub-national level if the sub-national surveillance system traces
and reports the travel history of patients who have visited other sub-national
areas. Implementation of such analysis requires travel size estimates across
sub-national units in addition to the traveler case reports.
When comparing the estimates from the traveler data to the ones from
domestic data, we found that the using only the traveler data had several
limitations. One would need relatively accurate information about when the
epidemic first started in the travel origins. A large estimate of exponential
growth rate from the travel data could imply either a fast growth rate or
a severe under-reporting of initial cases. More fundamentally, how well one
can estimate the domestic epidemic using the traveler data depends on how
representative the traveler samples are. As an extreme example, if the travel-
ers were all young adults with good health, using the traveler data would’ve
underestimated the epidemic in the general population. In our model, we
introduced a non-zero intercept β0 in the exponential growth curve, trying
to correct the sampling bias. However, without further information, we could
only use a non-informative prior on β0. Studies that could potentially im-
prove this sampling bias correction include, but are not limited to, better
understanding the travelers’ demographics, such as age, gender, sub-national
region of residence, etc.
Finally, we provided an easy-to-use tool for policy makers to determine
the growth rate of local epidemic based on exported cases. A user-friendly
Shiny App was developed to accommodate flexible scenarios that fit different
countries’ situations.
Rapid detection of early disease outbreak is crucial for government inter-
vention and raising public awareness. The traveler case reports data seems
to be a good addition to the domestic surveillance data by utilizing the diag-
nosis resources from all countries. We advocate that countries should work
in a collaborative way, by sharing the traveler patients information about
the travel dates and more detailed travel history at sub-national level, in a
timely manner. Working together, we would strengthen the global infectious
disease surveillance system, which is especially important in detecting disease
outbreaks in countries where public health infrastructure is rudimentary or
20
nonexistent.
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(a) βˆ1 in Wuhan between Jan 13 and Jan
23
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(b) βˆ1 in United States between Mar 6
and Mar 13
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(c) βˆ1 (left) in Italy between Feb 24 and
Feb 28
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(d) βˆ1 in Iran between Feb 20 and Feb
27
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(e) βˆ1 in Egypt between Feb 28 and Mar
6
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(f) Probability of the number of severe
case patients exceeds the hospital capac-
ity in Wuhan, China
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Figure 4: The estimated exponential growth rate, βˆ1, under different initial number of
cases in (a) Wuhan, China, (b) United States, (c) Italy, (d) Iran, (e) Egypt. The red
horizontal lines indicate the mean (solid) and 95% credible interval (dashed) estimated
from domestic data. (g) the estimated probability of the number of severe case patients
exceeds the hospital capacity under different initial number of cases in Wuhan, China.
The dots are the posterior mean and error bars are the 95% confidence credible intervals.
Different color represents different initial number of cases.
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Figure 5: The value of information (VOI) of daily case and arrival date reports during Jan
13 - Jan 23. The blue lines are the VOIs of daily case reports. The red lines are the VOIs
of daily arrival date reports. Each sub-figure corresponds to estimating β1 on a different
date t, shown as the sub-title.
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(a) Total number of exported cases stratified by the number of days since the
initial local infection
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(b) Total number of exported cases stratified by the number of days since the first
exported traveler case
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Figure 6: Hypothesis test of whether the exponential growth rate exceeds 0.1. The require
cumulative total of traveler cases to reject the null hypothesis. The tests were conducted
under three different significance levels: 0.05 (blue), 0.01 (green), and 0.001 (red). The
x-axis indicates (a) the number of days since the initial local infection, (b) the number of
days since the first exported case. The y-axis indicates the cumulative total of exported
cases at the day indicated by x-axis.
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